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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A grand theft a 
transaction card, with a persistent violator sentencing enhancement. He received an 
aggregate unified sentence of five years, with one year fixed. 
On appeal, Mr. Weatherly asserts his conviction and punishment for both the 
greater offense of grand theft of a financial transaction card and the lesser-included 
offense of possession of a financial transaction card, twice placed him in jeopardy for 
the same offense and, therefore, violated both the United States and Idaho 
Constitutions. 
In response, the State argued that Mr. Weatherly's double jeopardy argument 
could not be reviewed as fundamental error because "it is not at all clear whether the 
'pleading theory' even applies under the Idaho Constitution." This Reply Brief is 
necessary to address the State's claim. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Weatherly's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but 
are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
1 
ISSUE 
Was Mr. Weatherly twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense when he was 
convicted of and was sentenced for both the greater offense of grand theft of a financial 




Mr. Weatherly Was Twice Placed In Jeopardy For The Same Offense When He Was 
Convicted And Sentenced For Both The Greater Offense Of Grand Theft Of A Financial 
Transaction Card, And The Lesser-Included Offense Of Possession Of A Financial 
Transaction Card 
Mr. Weatherly contends that his rights under the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the 
Idaho Constitution and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution were 
violated when he was convicted and punished for the greater offense of grand theft of a 
financial transaction card, as well as the lesser-included offense of possession of a 
financial transaction card. 
The State argues that Mr. Weatherly has failed to show fundamental error. The 
State misapplies the Idaho Supreme Court precedent governing double jeopardy and 
the pleading theory. 
On appeal, Mr. Weatherly argued that under the '"pleading' theory, possession of 
a financial transaction card, as charged by the State, is a lesser included offense to 
grand theft of a financial transaction card." (Appellant's Brief, pp.11-13.) In response, 
relying on State v. Corbus, 151 Idaho 368 (Ct. App. 2011 ), the State argues that 
Mr. Weatherly has failed to show fundamental error "because it is not at all clear 
whether the 'pleading theory' even applies under the Idaho Constitution." 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.9-10.) 
In Corbus, relying on Stewart1, Pizzuto, and Sivak, the Idaho Court of Appeals 
found that "the available authority does not provide a clear answer to the question of 
1 The Court's reliance on Stewart is misplaced as the Idaho Supreme Court made it 
clear that the claim in Stewart was raised only under the Double Jeopardy clause of the 
United States Constitution. State v. Stewart, 149 Idaho 383, 386, 389-390 (201 O). 
3 
analytical in double cases which a 
151 
is in the case law and 
ignores State v. Curtis, 130 Idaho 522,524 (1996). 
In Sivak, the Court was asked to determine whether Sivak's robbery conviction 
merged into his felony murder conviction thereby violating Sivak's double jeopardy 
protections. State v. Sivak, 112 Idaho 197, 205-206 (1986). The Sivak Court 
specifically acknowledged that in addition to the statutory theory, Idaho has adopted 
"the broader indictment or pleading theory." Id. at 206. The Court continued, "[t]his 
theory holds 'that an offense is an included offense if it is alleged in the information as a 
means or element of the commission of the higher offense."' Id. (quoting State v. 
Anderson, 82 Idaho 293, 301 (1960).) The Sivak Court cautioned that under the 
pleading theory, "the issue is analyzed in reference to the facts of each case." Id. The 
Court noted that it would reach the same conclusion under the statutory test or the 
pleading theory. Id. at 211 n.8. Then in Pizzuto, the Idaho Supreme Court again 
addressed the claim to whether robbery was the lesser included offense of felony 
murder. Id. State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 756-757 (1991). Relying extensively on 
Sivak, the Pizzuto Court again found a double jeopardy violation under both the Idaho 
Constitution and the United States Constitution. Id. at 758. The Court implied that it 
would reach the same conclusion applying either the statutory test or pleading theory. 
Id. 
2 Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197 (1986); State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742 (1991), 
overruled on other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991); State v. Stewart, 
149 Idaho 383 (2010). 
4 
While the Corbus cites both Pizzuto and Sivak for the proposition that they 
a standard review it is as 
cases same was 
State v. Thompson, 101 Idaho 430, 433 (1980). Moreover, in each case, the Idaho 
Supreme Court concluded that the appellant was entitled to relief under either theory. 
Even if Sivak and Pizzuto somehow articulated a different analysis under the pleading 
theory, they were overruled in 1997 by Curtis, supra, which was not cited by the Court 
of Appeals in Corbus. In Curtis, this Court reiterated that: 
There are two theories under which a particular offense may be 
determined to be a lesser included offense of a charged offense. Under 
the first theory, a court will determine whether a crime is a lesser included 
offense by first looking to the statute defining the crime and ascertaining if 
the matter urged as a lesser included offense is one that is necessarily 
included in that crime which is defined in the particular statute. This theory 
has been referred to as the "statutory theory." 
Under the second theory a court will look to see if the information 
(complaint) charges the accused with a crime the proof of which 
necessarily includes the proof of the acts which constitute the lesser 
included offense. This theory is referred to as the "pleading theory." 
Curtis, 130 Idaho at 524 (internal citations omitted); see also State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 
525 (2011) (applying the pleading theory and holding that sexual abuse of a minor is not 
a lesser included offense of lewd conduct because it was not alleged that he committed 
the crime of sex abuse as a means of committing lewd conduct). In the instant case, 
Mr. Weatherly asserts, as alleged in the charging documents, the crime of possession 
of a financial transaction card is a lesser included offense to grand theft by use of a 
financial transaction card. This is so because the factual predicate for the commission 
of both offenses was the same. That is, Mr. Weatherly's possession of the card was the 
factual means by which he committed offense of by use of a financial 
5 
card. a in was to 
or Mr. Weatherly's 
of a financial transaction card was the means of committing the offense of 
grand theft by use of a financial transaction card. 
The State concedes that Mr. Weatherly's "argument that one cannot steal a 
financial transaction card without possessing it, and that criminal possession of a 
financial transaction card is thus a lesser included offense of grand theft," may be a 
plausible argument, had it been raised below. (Respondent's Brief, p.8.) The State 
claims that Mr. Weatherly cannot show "plain error" due to the lack of precedent-that 
there are no Idaho appellate court decisions in which the court specifically considered 
the issue. (Respondent's Brief, p.8.) The State claims that, because there is no Idaho 
case law in which an appellate court considered the issue of whether grand theft of a 
financial transaction card constitutes criminal possession of a financial transaction card, 
Mr. Weatherly cannot show plain error. (Respondent's Brief, p.8.) The State references 
Corbus in support of this proposition; however, Corbus does not stand for this 
proposition and is distinguishable because the Corbus Court, when analyzing the 
defendant's claim that he had been subjected to multiple convictions and punishments 
under the Idaho Constitution, relied on federal law and referenced multiple federal 
cases in which there was a circuit split as to the legal issue; thus, the law was not clear 
for that reason. Corbus, 151 Idaho at 372. Such is not the case here as 
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